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ABSTRACT  
This project aims to study the role of experts in shaping climate policy. The problem of 
climate change poses challenges to those who develop policy instruments to reduce carbon 
emissions; this is as a result of complexity and uncertainty within the scientific field of 
climate research. As a result of this, expertise has had a particularly strong influence on 
development of policy. A qualitative analysis of the Climate Change Act adopted in 2008 by 
the UK Government and the advisory expert body the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), 
which was established as a part of the Climate Change Act to advise the Government on 
climate science, is therefore used as a case study to illustrate the relationship between 
expertise and policy-makers. In light of Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ (2002, 20007) much 
debated efforts to create a normative theory of expertise, as well as some of the responding 
critical questions presented by Sheila Jasanoff (2003) and Brian Wynne (2003) I will analyse 
how expertise and policy makers interact to create the appropriate means to reduce carbon 
emissions.   
     The thesis also shows how the Government wanted to create a group with different 
expertise to summarize climate research in a better way in order to develop the best climate 
policy. It further examines the way in which the experts in the Committee work to promote 
their own expertise within the field of climate science as a united group of experts, an effort 
much in line with Collins and Evans’ proposed theory of expertise. Furthermore, this thesis 
shows that creating the CCC would be an interesting experiment as to how the Government 
can gather a group of experts from different scientific fields to let them work together to 
produce scientific advice that the Government has to listen to and create policy from, thus 
giving the experts a high power to influence policy.  
     In light of Jasanoff and Wynne’s work, however, the examination shows how different 
framings of scientific disputes could provide better insight to the solution. The analysis also 
shows how the boundaries between politics and science are blurred, thus suggesting that the 
Committee would benefit from public participation as a way to ensure that they produce the 
best result possible. This thesis presents a contribution to an ongoing discussion in the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) concerning how expertise should be classified in 
connection with science-related disputes. 
 
Keywords: Expertise, framing, co-production, policy, society, law and climate change. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With this thesis I will contribute to the ongoing and much debated effort of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) scholars Harry Collins and Robert Evans to create a normative 
classification of scientific expertise. In their article The Third Wave of Science Studies: 
Studies of Expertise and Experience, Collins and Evans argue that the field of science studies 
has shown why science and technology cannot always solve technical problems in the public 
domain. This is particularly the case because “The speed of political decision-making is faster 
than the speed of scientific consensus formation” (Collins and Evans 2002: 127). A subject 
over recent years has been the need to expand the domain of technical decision-making 
beyond the technically qualified elite, so as to improve political legitimacy. Collins and Evans 
argue, however, that the “Problem of Legitimacy” has been replaced by the “Problem of 
Extension”—that is, by a tendency to dissolve the boundary between experts and the public so 
that there are no longer any grounds for limiting the indefinite extension of technical decision-
making rights. Moreover, they argue that a new theory of expertise, what they call the Third 
Wave of Science Studies or the Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE), is necessary to 
solve the problem of extension. In response to this article, Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne 
argue that this normative classification of expertise overlooks valuable insights from the STS 
field regarding the relationship between society and science.  
     Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne’s critique of the Third Wave of Science Studies was not 
mentioned in Collins and Evans’s next book Rethinking Expertise. As Mads Dahl Gjefsen 
(2009: V) mentions in his thesis as a critique of Collins and Evans, that Investigating different 
framings in scientific disputes will contribute to the classification of expertise. From the point 
of view of STS scholarship, an analytical approach focusing on the processes by which 
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research questions are framed or formulated is promising in terms of understanding the basis 
for public involvement and stance taking in science-related disputes. These are timeless but 
nevertheless relevant questions in the field of STS: analysing expertise, how it works and how 
it is organised. The STS discipline is well suited for analysis of the Climate Change Act and 
the CCC expert advisory body. 
     To shed light on this discussion, I have chosen to test the arguments from both sides of the 
debate on a case study concerning the British Climate Change Act and the advisory expert 
body, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) In this thesis, the Committee on Climate 
Change “CCC” refers to the Non-Departmental Public Body set up through the Climate 
Change Act 2008. Doing so allows me to find out how the law frames and classifies expertise 
within the CCC, and how the Committee formulates and frames their scientific contributions 
to the law.  My objective is to answer the following three questions: 1) How does the Climate 
Change Act frame and define expertise within the Committee? 2) How does the CCC frame 
and formulate its scientific contributions to the Act? 3) How will analysing and evaluating the 
CCC contribute to Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ efforts to create a normative theory of 
classification of expertise?  
 
1.1.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter one introduces the research questions, conceptual framework, and methodology of 
this thesis. It further provides some insight into the field of STS.  
     The theory is presented in chapter two, as are the issues surrounding the normative 
classification of expertise. In this chapter, I also present some of the concepts that will be used 
in my analysis.  
     In chapter three, I present my case study and two of my
 
research questions. In chapter four, 
I analyse my case study using the work of Harry Collins, Robert Evans, Sheila Jasanoff, and 
3 
 
 
Brian Wynne in the field of classifying expertise. I also consider what contributions might be 
made to further develop Collins and Evans’ efforts to create a normative theory of expertise. 
At the end of this chapter, I share some of my main findings and in chapter five the 
conclusions of the thesis are presented.  
 
1.1.2 BACKGROUND FOR CHOICE OF SUBJECT 
My motivation for writing this thesis stems from my interest in the interface between energy, 
agriculture, and the environment. On March 22, 2011, I attended a seminar at Litteraturhuset 
(The House of Literature in Oslo, where people can come together to communicate and 
promote interest in literature and reading, as well as freedom of speech issues) on the 
possibility of a climate change law being enacted in Norway. This seminar introduced me to a 
similar law enacted by the UK in 2008. The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate 
Change, a 700-page report published for the British Government on October 30, 2006 by 
economist Nicholas Stern, proved an important tool in the process of passing the Climate 
Change Act. The report discusses the effects of global warming on the world economy. 
Although this is not the first economic report written about climate change, it is the most 
elaborated and discussed report of its kind. The Stern Report, which offers a comprehensive 
cost analysis of greenhouse emissions, states that climate change is the largest and most 
comprehensive market failure in existence, presenting a unique challenge to the economy. 
The Stern Report’s primary conclusion is that the benefits of strong early action on climate 
change outweigh the long-term costs of inaction. As a result of this report and a campaign 
called The Big Ask led by Friends of the Earth, Britain enacted a climate change law in 2008.  
     A climate law will ensure that climate goals are set, and that preventative measures are 
planned for decades in advance. The Climate Change Act makes emissions targets legally 
binding. A binding target of how low the greenhouse gas emissions must be in the future 
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provides the basis for a long-term community planning. It also creates a situation in which 
climate change objectives should and must be reached regardless of changing political 
priorities. 
     The Climate Change Act combines all of my interests; it addresses issues concerning 
ecological economics also called living economy, sustainability, long-term commitments 
across government changes, responsibility, expertise, and of course, putting it all into practice. 
In my thesis, I investigate the links between the Committee on Climate Change and the 
Climate Change Act itself during the period from 2008 to 2011.  
     I am particularly interested in investigating the relations between science and policy and 
how policy can help to "control" climate change issues. Moreover, the Act could serve as a 
template for other laws that can help to ensure a more sustainable environment in the future. 
The British experience can also be a useful contribution in a debate about how a long-term, 
reliable and stable climate and energy policy should take form in Norway and other countries.  
 
1.1.3 THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 
According to the handbook of Science and Technology Studies (STS), STS began to take 
shape as a discipline in the 1960s. There were calls for a “science of science”, and for 
attempts to create an explicit and rational “science policy”. In 1965, the Science of Science 
Foundation was established in London. The works of Robert K. Merton (1973) in the 
sociology of science contributed to the birth of STS, but, as a number of early critics pointed 
out, this tradition took for granted the essentially positive view of science that was also 
implied in the drive for rational scientific policy. Drawing from work in the disciplines of 
History, Sociology, Philosophy, Anthropology, Cognitive Psychology, and Linguistics, the 
1970s saw the emergence of a radical and new “sociology of scientific knowledge” (SSK). 
This research had an academic, humanistic aim, and drew much of its initial inspiration from 
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the work of Thomas Kuhn and to a lesser extent from J. D. Bernal and Michael Polanyi. The 
“swing away from science in the schools” led to discussions about science with “social 
responsibility, reform science education—to liberalise it, to make it more human” (Edge 
1995: 4). By the end of the decade, innovations on these lines had been made. One major 
result of these educational innovations of interdisciplinary interactions was that serious 
attention was paid to interdisciplinary collaborations, in both teaching and research. This 
feature has profoundly influenced the course of STS (Edge 1995: 3-11). The emerging field of 
STS has adopted as its fundamental concern the investigation of knowledge societies in all 
their complexity: their structure and practices, their ideas and material products, and their 
trajectories of change. Having grown from many disciplines means that STS today 
encompasses a rich tapestry of theoretical and methodological perspectives, all specifically 
directed toward investigating the place of science and technology in society (Jasanoff 2004).  
     There are challenges around how to manage science and to control the community of 
experts. These questions are old but still relevant and controversial. This is where the STS 
field can contribute: STS research criticises that having scientific knowledge makes it 
possible to speak truth to power. This is complicated; it never goes only in one direction, 
where science only affects society or politics and not the other way around.  
     In the field of STS, some authors have argued that awareness of the environmental crisis 
has influenced a partial shift in the social contract between science and politics (Irwin and 
Michael 2003). Disenchantment and loss of public trust in science and technology (Wynne 
2008) have culminated the expectations placed on environmental sciences and green 
technologies. The environmentalist movement is critical of science as well as deeply 
dependent on it.  
My theoretical chapter demonstrates a thorough introduction to the debate surrounding the 
theory of expertise presented mainly by Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Sheila Jasanoff and 
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Brian Wynne. Analysis of the use of expertise and how it is classified is central to the field of 
STS, as is the relationship between expertise and politics. It is also important to note that my 
thesis will not evaluate the merits or efficacy of the Climate Change Act. Rather, based on the 
field of STS, I will discuss the use of experts in environmental politics. Who are the experts 
on the environment and what factors give them credibility? An important task for my thesis 
will be to investigate how expertise is recognized, framed, and disseminated within the 
political realm. 
  
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
This study falls within the fields of environmental and STS studies, and it addresses expertise 
within the field of environmental issues. On a normative level, this thesis seeks a conceptual 
means toward inclusive forms of environmental governance (Jasanoff 2001).  
      In order to ensure good quality research, it is important to consider reliability and validity. 
Reliability is an important criterion in social research as it is tied to whether the research is 
conducted in a credible and trustful manner. Validity is tied to the legitimacy of the 
interpretations the researcher has reached (Thagaard 2009).  
      I will rely on theory from the field of STS for analysis in my thesis. I also rely on other 
disciplines including Sociology, Environmental ecology studies, Economics, and 
Anthropology as part of my literature. As the primary source I will draw upon to describe my 
case, I look to the Climate Change Act published by the Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). A 
major part of my empirical work concerns the Committee on Climate Change. To this end, I 
focus on three progress reports as the foundation of my empirical data: Meeting Carbon 
Budgets – the need for a step change; Progress report to Parliament Committee on Climate 
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Change October 2009, Meeting Carbon Budgets ensuring a low-carbon recovery. 2
nd
 
progress report to Parliament Committee on Climate Change June 2010, Meeting Carbon 
budgets: -3
rd
 Progress Report to Parliament – 30 June 2011. Furthermore, I use the three 
corporate plans published in 2008-2009, 2009-2010, and the Committee on Climate Change 
framework document published by Her Majesty’s Government. I also include information 
from the remaining reports that have been published by the CCC, but the seven reports I 
mention above form the foundation of my empirical work concerning the CCC.  I also include 
literature from different organisations and institutions that are related to my case.  
The Climate Change Act and the Committee were established in 2008. I have chosen to 
include the entire period from 2008 through June 2011. I rely mostly on the British 
Government and the Committee on Climate Change’s own records and documents. 
Throughout the data collection process I have also consulted different documents that I found 
of relevance to my thesis. These documents are briefly presented before referring to them in 
the text.  
 
1.2.1 THE CASE 
A common understanding of the case study tells us that it is research on an empirically limited 
unit, such as a group or an organization where the phenomenon is being studied in its natural 
environment and the research is based on several sources of data (Thagaard 2009).  
     Yin (2009) describes that a case study can be used as a template for further investigation. 
The purpose of reliability is to ensure the possibility of replication of the study. Reliability is 
achieved here by including the sources of information, as with references, so that any use of 
data can be scrutinized. As Yin (2009), discusses, case studies can be supported by several 
types of data it is seen as advantageous if one can use more than one source at once. Several 
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sources can then supplement and strengthen each other.  
     In this thesis, I have decided to study a single organisation, as an individual case will 
generate in-depth information on this specific case. However, there is no assurance that the 
result and conclusions will be applicable to all organisations of this kind and any kind of 
generalisation can therefore not be made from this study alone. Only through repetition of 
studies of similar cases can this case study contribute to the theoretical development of 
classifications of expertise (Yin 2009). 
 
1.2.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In this thesis I have used a hermeneutic approach, i.e. the doctrine of interpretation of texts. 
This methodological principle maintains that one idea will be understood by another idea and 
another idea through the first, in other words, both a contextual and cognitive understanding. 
Additionally, the thesis will conduct a qualitative literature study to examine the Climate 
Change Act and Climate Change Committee. A study of literature seeks to gather information, 
process it critically, and then summarise the material. This material in its processed form will 
then form the basis for discussion that will reveal the problem and thus contribute to the 
theoretical development of expertise.  
     As mentioned in the text above a key method of analysis in this paper is the interpretation 
of text. I started out reading official documents regarding the Climate Change Act and reports 
from individual publishers. This gave me basic knowledge about the Climate Change Act, and 
literature to further investigated the Committee on Climate Change and its connection to the 
Climate Change Act. Since the Committee on Climate Change actively and knowingly obtain 
attention to their expertise, both through its own marketing and editorial media coverage, the 
amount of text material available to the public was satisfactory. All sources that I have 
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collected are considered to be relevant to the research questions. A high number of press 
clippings, public appearances by the Committees advocates and through their websites have 
been studied in connection to my thesis. Only the most relevant of these are referred to, and to 
make the analysis valid and reliable, I have attached the sources that I have found online with 
the URLs to the list of references. Thagaard (2003) emphasizes that written sources must be 
understood from its context and purpose, and it is obvious that the Committees promotional 
materials, publications and website will seek to present the committee and their expertise in a 
positive way. This is balanced by also analysing literature that is skeptical of Committee. I 
also rely extensively on literature from the field of STS to analyse the classification of 
expertise placed in the context of the Committee on Climate Change 
     In order to achieve a comprehensive approach to the problem, the most suitable literature 
must be used. It is necessary to be able to trust what is written in the literature being used, and 
to ensure that important information is not omitted. A literature review makes it possible to 
specialise in a subject, yet on the other hand, it is difficult to question the written sources. It is 
therefore necessary to rely on theory, self-knowledge, and critical ability to process the 
material. Although it is impossible to free myself from my own past understanding and the 
society I live in, individual performances and background, my aim is always to be as 
objective, analytical, and critical as possible. 
     Throughout this chapter my aim was to explain my methodological and analytical strategy 
and choices in order to increase the reliability of this research. 
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2. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF EXPERTISE AND TO CONCEPTS 
OF CO-PRODUCTION AND FRAMING 
2.1 DEBATING EXPERTISE 
The definition of “expertise” is not a matter that concerns just Harry Collins and Robert 
Evans and other STS scholars, nor is it strictly an academic subject. On the contrary, it is a 
highly disputed political issue. Increasingly, citizens organize themselves to validate or 
contest this definition (for instance, activists of environmental movements may claim that 
scientific knowledge on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is uncertain, so it should 
not count as reliable expertise). Conflicts and disagreements regarding science and technology 
make it clear that there is a diversity of political cultures and social understandings of 
expertise (Jasanoff 2005). Furthermore, Nelkin (1975: 36) explains that the reason experts 
have authority is that they are expected to make their interpretations and analysis based on a 
rational and objective thinking.  
     According to Collins and Evans (2007:13), there is a need for a new sociology of expertise. 
To better understand the function of expertise, Collins and Evans analyse the meaning of 
expertise and put forth a definition of experts. Acquiring expertise is a social process, a matter 
of socialization with expert groups, and expertise can diminish if time is spent away from the 
groups. Collins and Evans (2007: 14) present the “Periodic Table of Expertise” wherein 
scientific expertise is made comparable to various forms of lay knowledge. I will now briefly 
present some of the different forms of expertise from their table I think are relevant for my 
thesis.  
    Ubiquitous expertise is the expertise that includes the endless list of indescribable skills it 
takes to live in a human society. To illustrate this point, Collins and Evans (2007: 16-18, 2-3) 
present the example of the French language as it is in England and as it is in France. A person 
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who can speak French fluently in England is considered an expert, and may be able to get 
paid to work as a translator or interpreter, while someone who is fluent in French in France is 
not a “French Expert”. If, however, he or she speaks fluent English in France, he or she might 
be called an expert in English. Contributory expertise refers to the ability to engage in the full 
range of activities associated with membership of a community. It also encompasses tacit 
knowledge, as well as practical, craft, and linguistic skills. Interactional expertise, on the other 
hand, is contributory expertise minus the practical or craft skill. As a result, a person with 
interactional expertise is fully able to talk knowledgably about a topic, but is unable to carry 
out the practical tasks associated with it. More informally, a person with interactional 
expertise can “talk the talk” but not “walk the walk” (Collins and Evans 2007: 28-30).   
     According to Collins and Evans, one must distinguish between different types of expertise. 
This can contribute to making the existing knowledge more evident for example in a 
controversy. This can help to change the direction and also contribute to a fruitful discourse. 
Collins and Evans go on to explain the notion of a core-set. A core-set has been defined as 
being made up of those scientists deeply involved in experimentation or theorisation directly 
relevant to a scientific controversy or debate. A core-set is often quite small, consisting of 
perhaps a dozen scientists (Collins and Evans 2002). A core-group is a group of scientists that 
emerges after a controversy has been settled. It is only the members of the core-sets or the 
core-group, which can contribute to the formation of consensus if the science is only likely to 
be understood by a small number of people with a specialised knowledge or interest.  
     However, it is not always easy to define the boundaries of a core-set because disputes 
within a core-set often involve the boundary work of defining people as legitimate or 
illegitimate commentators. Having accepted that to categorise expertise makes sense despite 
the boundary problems, the task is to begin to work out what these types of expertise mean 
and how they fit together.  
12 
 
 
To separate the different definitions from one another, Collins and Evans (2002) use Brian 
Wynne’s study of the relationship between scientists and sheep farmers after the radioactive 
fallout from the Chernobyl disaster which contaminated the Cumbrian fells (Wynne 1996). 
Wynne found that the sheep farmers knew a great deal about the ecology of sheep, and about 
their behaviour. They also had a great deal of knowledge about the rainwater on the fells. This 
knowledge was relevant to the discussion of how the sheep and the fells should be treated so 
as to minimize the impact of the contamination. The farmers have characteristics of a core-
group of experts in terms of experience in the ecology on sheep living on the grasslands, even 
though they have no formal qualifications. According to Collins and Evans (2002), the 
farmers have contributory expertise, which in some respects is more important than that of 
scientists working for the relevant governmental department.  
    The scientists claimed the radioactivity would only remain in the soil for a couple of weeks 
and so a ban was posted on Cumbrian sheep. After testing the soil again later, the levels were 
still the same. After this, the scientists introduced a ban on sheep from Cumbria. It was 
difficult for farmers to keep the sheep during winter due to the expensive costs for hay. They 
were unable to sell the wool because it had been dyed orange by the experts. The farmers now 
only had two choices. They could either believe the scientists who told them that 
contamination would go away with time or they could sell the sheep at extremely low prices. 
Many farmers believed the experts and kept waiting until they could sell their sheep 
uncontaminated. In the process, they lost a lot of money or just gave up. Eventually, it turned 
out that the method the experts had used to test the soil in Cumbria was not appropriate for 
the kind of soils found there. The experts should have included the farmers’ expertise on the 
soil and vegetation on the pasture where the sheep grazed.  
     The scientists, however, were reluctant to take any advice from the farmers. In the end, 
taking such advice would have proved beneficial. This seemingly trivial point helps us to 
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understand what expertise is. The normative point that follows is that the body of expertise 
that should have emerged in respect of the Cumbrian sheep was a culmination of the separate 
contributory expertise possessed by the scientist and the farmers. The scientists’ expertise was 
not at risk of being displaced by that of the farmers; it was, or should have been, added to by 
that of the farmers. To produce the optimum outcome, Collins and Evans (2002) suggest that 
the scientists needed to have interactional expertise to absorb the expertise of the farmers. 
Unfortunately, they seemed reluctant either to develop or to use such expertise.  
      Wave Two analyses the problem of the classifying experts who play a role in a debate, 
these experts can only be distinguished after the dust has settled, after it becomes clear whose 
claims became most convincing. Collins and Evans (2002) promote a third wave of science 
studies to deal with the problem of how to make decisions based on scientific knowledge 
before there is a scientific consensus. Decisions of public concern have to be made according 
to a timetable established within the political sphere not the scientific or technical sphere;  
The decisions have to be made before the scientific dust has settled because the pace of 
politics is faster than the pace of scientific consensus formation. Political decision-
makers are, therefore, continually forced to define classes of expert before the dust has 
settled (Collins and Evans 2002: 269) 
 
     What Collins and Evans argue is that sociologists of scientific knowledge, also have a duty 
to make history as well as reflect on it; they have a role to play in making history using their 
area of expertise namely knowledge. The Third Wave of science studies, SEE, turns, on a 
normative theory of expertise. The aim is to address the question of who should and who 
should not be contributing to decision-making using their expertise. According to Collins and 
Evans (2002) under Wave Three, expert and political rights can be seen to be much more 
balanced because of the new understanding of contested science that emerged from Wave 
Two. Collins and Evans (2002) resurrect the old distinction between the political sphere and 
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the sphere of expertise, but in this “new” model Collins and Evans wish to draw a boundary 
no longer between the class of professionals accredited experts and the rest; but between 
groups of specialists and the rest.  
 
2.1.1 INTRODUCTION OF FRAMING AND CO-PRODUCTION 
For Collins and Evans, expertise should be defined on the basis of knowledge standards. The 
final decision on whether some citizen groups have valid knowledge that should be included 
in technical decision-making corresponds to the academic experts. Interestingly, however, 
Collins and Evans present a rather static picture of the science-society interplay. For instance, 
Collins and Evans do not take into account that there has been a transformation of the 
traditional use of science as well as the spaces where scientific knowledge is developed. They 
defend the idea that it is possible to establish a distinction between facts and values, or 
science and politics (Irwin and Michael 2003).  
     Wynne (2003) believes that Collins and Evans’ approach reflects a flawed if widespread 
understanding of the problem of legitimacy. Instead of determining whether experts, like the 
ones in the case of the Cumbrian sheep farmers, are recognised or neglected, the problem of 
legitimacy has more to do with the institutional neglect of issues of public meaning. It is also 
important to ask how public issues are framed and thus given meaning. They then define the 
public domain to be only about whether or not something is true. They entirely ignore the fact 
that public policy processes, and public reactions to scientific discourse of nature and society, 
are processes often of implicit negotiations of public meanings.  
     Furthermore Wynne looks to the field of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) which 
considers the social influences and the role that social factors play in scientific development 
and unaddressed questions about what is “core” in the core-set and why is it considered “the 
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core”? The aforementioned core-set refers to those scientists deeply involved in 
experimentation or theorisation which is directly relevant to a scientific controversy or debate. 
      To elaborate on the concept of framing and the conflicting framings of the meaning of the 
issues, Wynne looks to the Brent Spar controversy, which concerns Shell dumping a disused 
platform on the North Atlantic ocean floor. Greenpeace activists launched a campaign to 
highlight the irresponsible dumping. Facing a consumer boycott of Shell’s petroleum, Shell 
decided to abandon their plans of dumping the platform. Greenpeace was later accused of 
deliberately misrepresenting the environmental risks posed by Brent Spar due to incorrect 
analysis of toxic wastes in the platform dump. Greenpeace, on the other hand, was not 
concerned with the one platform alone but with the fact that this was the first of 400 or more 
such platforms that would soon be decommissioned from the North Sea. If these were 
dumped, it could set a precedent for dumping all sorts of other waste, including UK nuclear 
waste-inventories that had been slated for ocean bed disposal. Moreover, Wynne (2003) 
explains that the propositional issue of “is it safe?” has to be accompanied by a definition of 
what “it” is, as well as what “safe” is.  
     In the The Third Wave of Science Studies Collins and Evans (2002) say nothing about the 
importance of context and the questions of meanings for such public issues. Even if the 
farmers’ limited specialist propositional knowledge had been recognized and used by the 
scientist for example, knowledge about local variations in environmental conditions, would 
still make the whole relationship a question of the power to define the meaning of the 
questions. In this case it remained with the institutional experts: scientists and officials 
(Wynne 2003). 
     According to Jasnoff (2003), it is the preoccupation with the mutual embedding of natural 
knowledge and social order, their co-production, which gives the accurate and authoritative 
work in science studies its staying power. For example, with the Cumbrian sheep farmers, it 
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was not merely that the farmers and radiation experts possessed different complementary 
knowledge about grazing conditions, local soils, and radioactive caesium uptake into 
vegetation. It was about the differences in their life worlds, entailing altogether different 
perceptions of uncertainty, predictability, and control. The knowledge stemming from these 
divergent experimental contexts was simply not additive because it represented radically other 
ways of understanding the world. 
     Furthermore, Jasanoff (2004) explains that expertise is not only something that is in the 
heads and hands of skilled persons, constituted through their deep familiarity with the 
problem in question, but rather that it is something acquired, and deployed within particular 
historical, political, and cultural contexts. Accordingly, who counts as an expert and what 
counts, as expertise in UK public health or environmental controversies may not necessarily 
be who or what would count for the same purpose in Germany or India or the USA.  
     It is hard to find forms of human organization or behaviour whose structure and function 
have not been affected, to some extent, by science and technology. What happens in science 
and technology today is interwoven with issues of meaning, values, and power in ways that 
demand sustained critical inquiry. As Jasanoff (2004: 150) points out, “In what conceptual 
terms, then, should we discuss the relationships between the ordering of nature through 
knowledge and technology and the ordering of society through power and culture?” 
     To fill this void, Jasanoff (2004b) elaborates on the concept of co-production, which has 
recently gained ground in the emerging field of Science and Technology Studies.  
 
2.1.2 CO-PRODUCTION  
Co-production, according to Jasanoff (2004b), is a way to gain explanatory power in broad 
areas of both present and past human activity by thinking of natural and social orders as co-
produced. Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in 
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which we know and represent the world (both society and nature) are inseparable from the 
ways we choose to live in them. Society cannot function without knowledge any more than 
knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports. Scientific knowledge, in particular, 
is not a transcendent mirror of reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, 
identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions in short, in all the 
building blocks of what we term social. 
     However, it is important to remember that co-production does not seek to foreclose 
competing explanations by laying claim to one dominant and all-powerful truth. It offers 
instead a new way of exploring the waters of human history, where politics, knowledge and 
invention are continually in flux (Jasanoff 2004b). Furthermore, Jasanoff (2004c) explains 
that co-production is not about ideas alone; it is equally about concrete, physical things. It is 
not only about how people organise or express themselves, but also about what they value and 
how they assume responsibility for their ideas and their inventions. Equally to the point, co-
production occurs neither at random nor contingently, but along certain well-documented 
pathways.  
     In the article The Role of Science in Environmental Regimes: The Case of LRTAP, Lidskog 
and Sundqvist (2002: 77-85) explain it is becoming harder to act without having science as a 
partner; there is an increase in people using science as a basis for their own positions in 
political debates. Furthermore, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002) write about a scientisation of 
environmental policy; however, a policy of scientisation also means a politicisation of science. 
Furthermore, they look at the theory of SSK again to understand three important findings that 
are crucial when analysing the role of science in environmental governance: namely, that 
knowledge never moves freely, that the value of science is the result of negotiation, and that 
science and policy are co-produced. Miller (2004: 254) describes the value of the co-
production idiom, which allows the observer to become familiar with a number of ways that 
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knowledge and the social order will be combined in the emergence of new phenomenon, such 
as climate change. Both Jasanoff and Wynne are concerned with the framing and context of 
understanding and defining expertise in science related issues. To further elaborate, the 
following section of this thesis will present information on the concept of framing. 
 
2.1.3 FRAMING 
According to Mads Dahl Gjefsen (2009), the concept of framing as understood in relation to 
discourse analysis is commonly traced back to anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972). 
According to Matthew Nisbet (2009), framing as a concept and an area of research spans 
disciplines of social science. Frames are interpretive storylines that set a specific train of 
thought in motion, communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be 
responsible for it, and what should be done about it. Framing is an unavoidable reality of the 
communication process, especially as applied to public affairs and policy. There is no such 
thing as unframed information, and the most successful communicators are very proficient at 
framing, whether using frames intentionally or intuitively.  
      Experts employ frames to simplify technical details and make them persuasive. 
Furthermore, Nisbet (2009) explains that framing is not synonymous with placing a false spin 
on an issue, even though some experts, advocates, journalists, and policymakers certainly do 
spin evidence and facts. Rather, in an attempt to remain true to what is conventionally known 
about an issue, as a communication necessity, framing can be used to pare down information, 
granting greater weight to certain considerations and elements over others. The earliest formal 
work on framing traces back four decades to sociologist Erving Goffman, who described 
words and nonverbal interactions as helping individuals negotiate meaning through the lens of 
existing cultural beliefs and world views. In the 1970s, cognitive psychologists Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky applied framing in experimental designs to understand risk 
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judgments and consumer choices, concluding in their Nobel Prize-winning research that, 
“perception is reference dependent.” If individuals are given an ambiguous or uncertain 
situation to consider, the different ways in which a message is presented or framed apart from 
the content itself can result in very different responses, depending on the terminology used to 
describe the problem or the visual context provided in the message (Nisbet 2009).  
Furthermore, Erving Goffman (1974: 10-11) investigated frames as those identifiable 
elements, which together make up the definitions of social situations. Thus frames can be 
understood as the unspoken sets of associations that are used to make sense of situations, 
statements or events real or imagined (Gjefsen 2009: 30). Furthermore, Gjefsen (2009: 31) 
has noted that:  
The notion of frame, then, is similar to everyday expressions such as context 
and setting, which help observers interpret events, the important analytical 
distinction being that Goffman refers to a theorised notion of what he 
perceived as basic mental categories, as opposed to the larger physical context 
in which some aspect of reality is being observed (although such wider context 
do, of course, influence the mental frames invoked in any given situation).  
 
     Wynne’s (2003: 402) use of the term framing is the most prevalent in much of the 
literature today, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Wynne (2003) writes that the crucial 
shortcoming of Collins and Evans is their lack of consideration for “how public issues are 
framed and thus given meaning.”  
     Investigating different framings in scientific disputes can provide a deeper understanding 
of the different contexts within the dispute, thus contributing to better solutions. In order to 
evaluate these theories of classifying expertise I will test them on a case. By using a case 
study, I can evaluate my findings and contribute to the development of the works on defining 
expertise. 
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3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT AND  
THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
I will now present a summary of the path leading to the Climate Change Act, which was 
established in 2008 in the United Kingdom. To elaborate, I look to The UK Climate Change 
Act 2008-Lessons for International Climate Laws, an independent review by Client Earth, a 
document published in 2009 by an environmental organization that works to protect the 
environment through advocacy, litigation and research. Furthermore, I consult the Climate 
Change Act 2008 (Her Majesty’s Government 2008) and a document published by the World 
Wildlife Fund Den Britiske klimaloven 2011 to provide the best insight into the Climate 
Change Act. 
 
3.1 THE PATH LEADING TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT  
According to Friends of the Earth (2008), the initiative behind the law was the need for legal 
grounds that would get politicians to actually carry out promises they presented in their 
political programs. At the same time, climate change increasingly became a higher priority on 
the political agenda. The threat became even clearer when the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change published the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation, in 2007 (IPCC 2011). The report The Stern Review which elaborates on 
the financial aspects of the climate threat written by Sir Nicholas Stern, professor in 
Economics at College de France. Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth drew a large 
audience to the cinemas and BBC icon David Attenborough told not just about nature’s 
magical greatness, but also shed light on the climate threat.  
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With broad bipartisan support in parliament and total support from important organisations in 
British society, among them the Confederation of British Industry and the Trade Union 
Congress, the Act was passed on November 26, 2008. The Act had, of course, additional 
support from the environmental groups led by Friends of the Earth. This organisation, 
consisting of 200 local groups throughout the UK, was the first to promote the ideas of a 
climate act. The co-operation between the various environmental organisations helped to 
apply the additional needed pressure.   
     According to Bjartnes (2011: 6-10), all of these factors helped to create an environment for 
the climate change issue in which political action could be motivated. When Britain had 
presidency of the EU in 2005 and later in the G8, then Prime Minister Tony Blair made 
climate change one of the most important issues on his agenda. His actions in the 
international arena resulted in additional pressure on him in Britain because he had to live up 
to his international commitments. At the same time, David Cameron, the elected leader of the 
Conservative Party was highly engaged in the climate issues and his advisers saw this as a 
huge potential to build his image as a responsible and environmentally conscious leader. 
Cameron's advisers also saw the Climate Change Act as a part of his strategy. (Bjartnes 2011: 
13-16).  
     There was, of course, an opposition to the broad consensus with Nigel Lawson as a 
prominent spokesperson. Nigel Lawson could be called the grandfather of British neo-liberal 
economics. According to Repeal the Act, an organization that works against the Climate 
Change Act (2011), the Climate Change Act risks burdening the British economy and 
consequently undermining competitiveness and the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do 
business. Further, Repeal the Act (2011) believes that climate change science is not well 
established, and that there are flaws in the climate change science of the IPCC assessments 
reports. Therefore, there is no sound reason to impose expensive and restrictive public policy 
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decisions on the British people without first providing convincing evidence that human 
activities are causing dangerous climate change beyond that resulting from natural causes. 
     The 2008 Climate Change Act commits the United Kingdom, uniquely in the world, to cut 
their CO2 emissions by 80 percent by 2050. This comes at a cost of up to £18.3 billion each 
year for the next four decades. In cash terms this amounts to £734 billion, making it far and 
above the most expensive law put through Parliament. This will equate to more than £880 a 
year for every household in the country. According to Repeal the Act (2011b), the UK will 
pay for more useless windmills and rapidly rising carbon taxes, high electricity bills, and 
other harsh carbon-reduction regulatory costs. The Climate Change Act will potentially 
destroy the economy by causing the export of British jobs to countries without carbon taxes, 
become the cause of fuel poverty for more than 5 million British citizens, raise the price of 
food, clothing, travel and continue to litter The British landscape with wind farms. 
 
3.1.1 MAIN POINTS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT 
The following are the main points of the Climate Change Act: 
 Enactment of the 2050 target (80 percent reduction compared to 1990) 
 Enactment of the 2020 target (as amended in 2009 from 26 to 34 percent reduction 
compared to 1990) 
 The introduction of a binding maximum limit of greenhouse gas emissions for each 
five year period up to 2050 (“carbon budgets”) 
 The Department of Energy and Climate Change are made responsible for attaining 
both the 2050 target and for reaching the goals of each and every carbon budget  
 Annual reporting on goal attainment 
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 Comprehensive procedures for determining and changing targets for budget periods 
and distributing responsibilities for implementing the necessary measures to make this 
possible  
 Establishing an independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which should be 
central in setting the agenda in relation to most decisions taken in pursuance of law. In 
addition it will provide its annual assessment of progress and achievement (HMG 
2008) 
     According to Her Majesty’s Government (2008) the Act is broken into four sections as 
follows:   
     Section 1. Carbon target and budgeting establishes the key elements of the legislation: the 
2050 target and the carbon budgets system. The Act establishes a legal duty on the 
Government to reduce the UK’s GHG emissions by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 
the year 2050 as well as an interim target for 2020. The Government must also establish a 
series of carbon budgets every five years, and must then prepare policies and proposals to 
meet those budgets. Section one also defines the requirement to establish a system of carbon 
accounting. 
     Section 2. The Committee on Climate Change establishes an independent Committee to 
advise the Government on the targets, budgets, and other matters related to action on climate 
change (both mitigation and adaptation), and to report annually to Parliament on progress 
towards meeting the targets and budgets. 
     Section 3. Trading schemes operated by setting caps on total GHG emissions from 
particular types of activities or sectors, and can limit high emission activities or encourage 
low-carbon or GHG-reducing activities. 
     Section 4. Impact and adaptation of climate change requires regular reports assessing how 
climate change is expected to affect the UK, as well as programmes for adaptation to climate 
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change to respond to the impacts and risks identified in the reports (Client Earth 2009: 13-20, 
Climate Change Act 2008). 
     According to Client Earth (2009: 13-20), the Act applies to the whole of the UK. The core 
duties under the Act (such as setting the 2050 target and the carbon budgets) apply to the 
Secretary of State and accordingly to the UK Government as a whole. However, the term 
“national authorities” in the legislation refers to the Secretary of State and the Governments of 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (known as the devolved administrations). Some of the 
powers and responsibilities established under the Act (e.g. the power to request the advice of 
the CCC) apply to all the national authorities. The Secretary of State must also consult with 
the devolved administrations on a wide range of matters (including setting the 2050 target and 
the level of carbon budgets). In addition, some provisions of the Act apply only to Wales. 
Scotland has also passed its own national climate change legislation, the Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009. 
     According to a central provision of the Act, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure 
that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80 percent lower than the 1990 
baseline. The provision creates a legal duty for the UK Government to reduce the UK’s 
emissions of Green House Gas emissions (GHG) by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 
2050. The UK’s emissions are adjusted to account for any carbon units bought from overseas 
“credits” or disposed of to third party “debits”. The 80 percent target is a unilateral target, 
which the UK has adopted into national legislation in the absence of EU or international 
commitments to such a target (HMG 2008).  
     The Act covers the UK’s emissions of CO2 and other specified GHG emissions. The 
reduction in GHG emissions required to comply with the duty can be achieved through 
actions taken in the UK and abroad. However, the Government has a duty under the Act to 
consider the need for UK domestic action on climate change in relation to both the 2050 
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target and the carbon budgets. The Government also has the power to amend the 2050 target, 
but this power can only be exercised under certain circumstances. The Act includes that it 
would be appropriate to change the target where the Government considers that there have 
been significant developments in scientific knowledge about climate change, European 
international law, or policy (HMG 2008). 
     In addition, developments at the EU and international levels such as a new international 
treaty on climate change could affect the UK’s commitments and make it appropriate to 
change the UK’s national target. The legislation allows the target to be “amended”, which 
could mean an increase or a decrease to the target, depending on the circumstances and what 
the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The year 1990, which is used as a baseline, can 
also be amended in response to significant developments in European or international law or 
policy. 
     According to HMG (2008), in addition to the 2050 target, the Act provides for an interim 
GHG emissions reduction target for 2020. The 2020 target must be set as part of the carbon 
budgeting process. Under section 5 of the Act, the carbon budget must be at least 34 percent 
lower than the 1990 baseline. The 2020 target can be amended in a similar way to that 
described above in relation to the 2050 target. 
     The 2050 target is supported by a series of carbon budgets. The Government must set these 
budgets for the net UK carbon account over consecutive five-year periods. The Government 
has a legal duty under the Act to ensure that the net UK carbon account for a given budgetary 
period does not exceed the level of the carbon budget. The Act required that the first three 
carbon budgets (2008-2012, 2013-2017 and 2018-2022) were set by June 1, 2009. Future 
budgets must be set at least 11 years in advance. For example, the next budget to be fixed—
the fourth budget for 2023-2027—must be set by the end of June 2012. The carbon budgets 
are intended to set the trajectory for emissions reductions between 2008 and 2050. The 
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budgets must be set with the intention of meeting the 2050 target and complying with the 
British, European, and international obligations. The level of the budgets, which include the 
years 2020 and 2050, must comply respectively with the targets for those years. Accordingly, 
the budget which includes the year 2020 must include at least 34 percent emissions reduction, 
and for 2050 at least 80 percent emissions reduction. Section 5 includes a power to set targets 
for future years (such as years after 2050), and if such a target is set, then the carbon budget 
for the period including that year must meet the relevant target. Carbon budgets are set by the 
Government through a statutory order, following advice from the CCC, consultation with the 
devolved administrations, and approval by Parliament (Client Earth 2009: 20-21, Climate 
Change Act 2008). 
     According to HM Government (2008), the Act establishes a number of new reporting 
requirements, and the Government must lay reports before Parliament as follows: reports 
setting out the Government’s expectations of the indicative annual ranges for the net UK 
carbon account for each year within a budgetary period, and on proposals and policies for 
meeting the carbon budgets for current and future budgetary periods. The reports must include 
details on how the proposals and policies will affect different sectors of the economy, the 
timescales over which the policies are expected to take effect, and how carbon units will be 
used in the budgetary period. Reports under the Act must be laid before parliament no later 
than 31 March in the second year after the year to which the period relates; for instance, the 
2008 report must be laid by March 31, 2010.  
     The Government has the power to borrow and bank emissions between budgetary periods. 
Up to one percent of the carbon budget of a future budgetary period may be carried back to 
the preceding budgetary period. The intended effect of this adjustment is to reduce the future 
budget and increase the earlier budget (in effect reducing emissions under the earlier budget 
less challenging to achieve). Alternatively, the whole or part of any amount by which a 
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carbon budget exceeds the net UK carbon account may be carried forward with the effect of 
increasing the future carbon budget. The procedure for making such adjustments involves 
consultation with the devolved administrations, and seeking and taking into account the 
advice of the CCC (Client Earth 2008 27-30). 
 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER ONE: HOW DOES THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT 
FRAME AND DEFINE EXPERTISE WITHIN THE COMMITTEE? 
I investigate how the Climate Change Act frames and defines the climate issue problems. By 
doing so I can also investigate how the Climate Change Act frames and defines expertise 
within the CCC. As Miller (2004: 244) describes,  
Only when the Earth’s climate was re-imagined as a global system, bringing views of 
the atmosphere into line with assumptions about the jurisdiction of international 
institutions, did claims about climate change begin to engage with debates about 
international politics. 
 
     According to the British Government, intervention was necessary since climate change is 
caused by emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. An externality exists, as those 
who emit do not have to bear directly the full cost of their actions. The global causes and 
consequences of climate change, coupled with the long-term and persistent nature of its 
impacts, strengthens the need for Government action. In addition, there may be barriers to 
optimal adaption caused by, for example, uncertainty and lack of information about the 
impacts of climate change. The Act creates a framework, which enables the UK to meet its 
domestic targets, as well as ensuring that the UK can meet existing and future international 
commitments for emissions reductions (DECC 2009).   
     One important effect of the climate law has been increased awareness of this issue 
amongst politicians. It has created greater focus on action. The Department of Energy and 
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Climate Change (DECC) also emphasises that the climate law has influence over how it is 
possible to work on climate issues throughout the Government. Climate change is higher on 
the agenda than it was previously, and any decisions that have positive climate effects will be 
prioritized when new policy is developed.  
     The message to the business sector has also become clearer: the UK is going through 
major changes and it will be necessary to make extensive investments in order to satisfy the 
relevant control. According to Bjartnes (2011), companies and business leaders plan the long-
term low carbon strategies for their businesses. Britain is to be de-carbonized and the question 
is not how but when it will happen. 
     Introduction of the Climate Change Act comes with the introduction of carbon budgets, 
which set a limit on greenhouse gas emissions in each five-year period until 2050. The 
purpose of this is to ensure that there is a gradual reduction of emissions in line with long-
term goals. The Government is obliged to set and maintain carbon budgets and to seek and 
consider the advice of the CCC. The CCC monitors the progress of the Government and 
reports to Parliament. If the Government declines to follow the Committee’s advice, it must 
explain its reasons for doing so. If it fails to meet a carbon budget, it must take action and put 
forward proposals to compensate for the excess emissions.  
 
3.2.1 ABOUT THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE WITHIN THE ACT: 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), and the Devolved Administrations in consultation with the 
Committee on Climate Change created a framework which guides how the CCC should work.  
     The Committee’s tasks and role in management are carefully defined in the Climate 
Change Act; it is designed in a way that gives the Committee’s publications high status and 
importance within the parliamentary system, both in relation to the executive and legislative 
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power. The Government must justify why they choose, if they do, to disregard the advice the 
expert body gives. The recommendations from the CCC thus hold a different status than 
advice from underlying administrative bodies that the Government can easily choose to ignore 
(CCC 2011).  
     To ensure its credibility, it is important that the Committee be able to clearly and rationally 
present the economics of the costs, benefits, and risks of abatement decisions. This means that 
the Committee’s members should be experts in their field, rather than representatives of 
specific stakeholder groups, and should be supported by a secretariat with a strong base of 
analytical skills. The following list provides an indication of the types of expertise that will be 
desirable in the overall composition of the Committee: economic analysis and forecasting, 
business competitiveness, financial investment, technology development and diffusion, 
energy production and supply, climate science, emissions trading, and climate change 
policy—in particular its social impacts (Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 2007: 38). 
     The composition of the Committee was further developed in 2010. The Government stated 
that in addition to the fields of expertise mentioned above, the Climate Change Act requires 
securing that the Committee has experience and knowledge of certain topics. These topics 
include climate change policy at the national and international level, and in particular its 
social impacts; climate science and other branches of science; differences in circumstance 
between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the capacity of national 
authorities to take action in relation to climate change (HM Government et al 2010: 18-20).  
     To gain a clearer understanding of how the Climate Change Act frames and defines 
expertise within the CCC, the next section of this thesis will investigate the different members 
of the board in the Committee. 
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3.2.2 THE COMMITTEE AND THEIR EXPERTISE 
The CCC is composed of eight members: a chair, and seven independent members. The 
Committee employs a Chief Executive and a secretariat of around 30 staff to provide 
analytical and corporate support and advice. In addition, a statutory adaption sub-Committee 
(ASC) was set up from 1 April 2009 to support the Committee in its analysis of how Britain is 
adapting to climate change. Lord John Krebs, who also sits on the main Committee, is the 
chair of the ASC, which also has eight individual members. The sub-Committee utilises six of 
the CCC’s secretariat staff (CCC 2011). It is important to include the information on the 
expertise of the members of the board, to clearly see how the Climate Change Act has framed 
and defined expertise within the CCC.  
     Lord Adair Turner is the chair of the CCC and a professor at the London School of 
Economics (CCC 2011b). Turner studied History and Economics at Gonville and Caius 
College, Cambridge from 1974 to 1978 (FSA 2011). Professor Samuel Fankhauser is a 
Principal Fellow at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change at the London School 
of Economics (CCC 2011b). David Kennedy is the Chief Executive of the Committee on 
Climate Change. He has a PhD in Economics from the London School of Economics (CCC 
2011b). 
     There are three members who have more interdisciplinary expertise. Professor Jim Skea is 
Research Director at UK Energy Research Center based at Imperial College. Skea has 
operated at the interface between energy, climate change research, policy-making, and 
business throughout his career (CCC 2011b). Professor Michael Grubb is senior research 
associate at Cambridge University and holds a visiting professorship at Imperial College. His 
education is within the field of energy economics and policy processes.  He is a Professor of 
Climate Change and Energy Policy (CCC 2011b). 
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The four last members have their expertise in the field of Mathematics, Biology and 
Theoretical Physics. Sir Brian Hoskins is a Professor of Meteorology at the University of 
Reading. Hoskins is a British dynamical Meteorologist and Climatologist (CCC 2011b). 
Professor Lord May of Oxford holds joint Professorship at Oxford University and Imperial 
College, and is a Fellow of Merton College, Oxford (Oxford University 2011). Professor Julia 
King is a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering (Aston University 2011). Professor 
Lord Krebs is Principal of Jesus College Oxford. He studied zoology and population ecology 
of birds for his undergraduate and PhD degree at Oxford (CCC 2011b). 
     In section 3.2, I have gone through the creation of the Climate Change Act and some of the 
main points of the act. Showing what kind of expertise the various members of the committee 
have will provide a better understanding of the different fields that have to come together and 
produce a climate science they all agree on. Investigating the processes of how the 
Government selected the Committee members also shows how the Climate Change Act 
carefully defines expertise within the Committee. The Climate Change Act framed and 
defined the expertise within the Committee by stating the expertise that was relevant when 
choosing the members of Committee. The Climate Change Act also formed a framework 
document, which sets out a work-plan for the Committee. These two factors form the CCC 
and the expertise to provide a wider climate science. In the next section I will give an 
introduction to the Committee on Climate Change and my second research question.   
 
3.3 THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE  
The CCC provides independent advice to the Government and devolved administrations on 
how Britain can best achieve its greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals, through setting 
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and meeting carbon budgets and targets, as well as other issues upon request (HM 
Government et al 2010: 3). 
     The CCC governance arrangements are fit to operate as a responsible and effective, non-
departmental public body, meeting statutory and other requirements. To achieve this, the CCC 
adapts to corporate and human resources processes that will facilitate the hiring, retention, 
and development of a skilled and professional workforce. In addition, the CCC must also 
establish appropriate internal controls, controlling costs and driving efficiency while also 
ensuring that the independent financial reporting and accounting arrangements are in place. 
Furthermore, the CCC must create effective sustainable environmental policies, and develop 
and implement effective communications strategies for internal and external stakeholders  
(HM Governmental 2010: 4-6).  
 
3.4 SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: HOW DOES THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE FRAME AND FORMULATE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ACT? 
The CCC is a high profile and independent public body that provides expert advice on setting 
and meeting carbon budgets. To investigate how they frame and formulate their work, and 
thus make scientific contributions to the Government, I will analyse the contributions of the 
CCC and how they work, what kinds of methods they use, and whom they interact with to 
find answers to my research question.  
     The CCC builds their profile by communicating effectively with the Government, other 
organisations, and the public. The CCC does so by engaging with relevant stakeholders 
including Government departments, business and industry, NGOs and academics. Specifically, 
the CCC organises a series of sectorial workshops to share and develop approaches (to 
mention just a few). The CCC meets with stakeholders on a bilateral basis, presenting 
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findings extensively to organizations and conferences. They attend and contribute to 
international events such as the UN 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen, and they work 
with key international actors including the US Government and the European Commission. 
They also develop the CCC website as the primary tool of communication. Furthermore they 
continue to develop site content, work on search engine optimization, and inbound-linking 
work to drive up traffic to the site. They also produce a monthly e-newsletter for stakeholders, 
undertake on-line marketing survey work, produce news stories, press releases, speeches, 
events, newsletters, audio and video material. In addition, they raise the media profile of the 
CCC through ongoing public relations and media work including the following: placing 
regular articles in national and sector press, managing of press enquiries and holding regular 
relationship-building meetings with main national press contacts (CCC 2009).  
     The CCC and the ASC meet on a monthly basis to review findings and analyses. Moreover, 
the CCC meets every three weeks to discuss their work plan. They publish these meetings as 
minutes of CCC meetings. The Committee have held 37 meetings up until now (November 23, 
2011) and they have published seventeen reports (CCC 2011c), of which the three annual 
progress reports, three corporate reports, and the Fourth Carbon Budget have been most 
significant.  
  
3.4.1 PUBLICATIONS 
The CCC works on the appropriate emissions reduction path to follow through the 2020s. As 
a result of this they published the Fourth Carbon Budget December 7, 2010. This report 
includes analysis of the power market reform, the carbon reduction commitment, and 
incentives for reduction of agriculture emissions.  
     The CCC published three annual progress reports during the time span between 2008-2011. 
As part of its statutory role, the Committee provides annual reports to Parliament on the 
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progress that the Government is making in meeting carbon budgets and in reducing emissions 
of greenhouse gases. I will give a brief summary of the main points in these reports, as this 
will allow me to investigate how they formulate their contributions to the Government.  
     In their first progress report, Meeting Carbon Budgets -the need for step
1
 change (2009), 
the CCC focused on developing a monitoring approach which better enables them to track the 
progress of carbon budgets, and on identifying clear challenges likely to be faced in meeting 
the budgets. They also showed that emissions only fell slightly in the five-year period before 
the recession. The CCC then argued that a step change in the pace of emissions reduction was 
required to achieve the carbon budgets. The CCC developed a set of indicators, which made it 
easier to assess emission trends in future years (CCC 2009: 7-13). 
     In their second progress report, Meeting Carbon Budgets-ensuring a low-carbon economy, 
(2010) the CCC considered the latest trends in annual emission reductions relative to the then 
current budget limits. In addition, the Committee assessed progress against their future 
indicators, which determined whether they were on track to meet the future budgets. The 
UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell 8.6 percent from 2008 to 2009 with reductions of 9.7 
percent in CO2 and 1.9 percent in non-CO2 emissions. According to the CCC, the reduction 
was largely due to the recession and other exogenous factors, which the Committee estimated 
could reduce emissions by up to 6 percent over the first budget period. By developing these 
new indicators the Committee implied that a step change in the pace of reductions was still 
required.  
     The Committee also recommended that new policies be introduced to strengthen 
incentives for energy efficiency improvement, investment in low-carbon power generation, 
development of an electric car market, and introduction of new practices in agriculture (CCC 
2010: 5-45). 
                                                          
1 A noticeable improvement 
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In the Committee’s third progress report, Meeting Carbon Budgets —3rd Progress Report to 
Parliament —30 June 2011 (2011f), it is stated that the Government accepted the advice of 
the Committee on the fourth carbon budget. The Committee recommended that this should 
limit UK greenhouse gas emissions to a maximum of 1.950 Metric Tonne Carbon Dioxide 
Equivalent (MtCO2e
2
) over the period 2023-27, and the aim should be to meet this budget 
through domestic emissions reductions. The analysis showed that it would be possible to meet 
this budget through deep cuts in emissions from power generation, heat in buildings, and 
surface transport. The Committee showed that such cuts are required if the UK is to meet its 
2050 target of reducing emissions by 80 percent below 1990 level, and could result in wider 
economic security of supply and environmental benefits. According to the Committee, to 
achieve these deep emission cuts in the 2020s, it will require significant reductions over the 
next decade. In the Committee’s first annual report published in 2009, they set out a 
framework of future indicators that enable the CCC to track whether steps are being taken to 
produce required emission reductions in subsequent years. For their second report in 2010, 
they developed analytical tools to isolate the impact of short-term economic fluctuations. 
These analytical tools showed that the 10 percent emissions reduction in 2009 was largely due 
to the recession. The third report (CCC 2011f) builds on the techniques developed in the first 
two. It adjusts recorded emissions in 2010 as well as macroeconomic impacts, showing that 
the underlying trend is one of broadly flat emissions. Analysis of the indicators meanwhile 
reveals mixed progress in implementing abatement measures. While emissions are continuing 
to run significantly below the first budget cap, acceleration in the pace of emissions reduction 
will be needed if future carbon budgets are to be achieved. The report highlights some key 
policies to drive this acceleration, including the Electricity Market Reform and the Green 
                                                          
2
 This is the standard measurement of the amount of CO2 emissions that are reduced or secluded from 
our environment. 
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Deal. 
     The CCC also delivered a report on Britain’s aviation emissions, as requested by the 
Government. The report, Meeting the UK aviation target —options for reducing emissions to 
2050, was published in December 2009. It assesses Britain’s aviation emission reduction 
trajectories for the period from 2009-2050 under the alternative assumptions about demand 
and carbon efficiency improvement, whilst continuing to use fossil fuel based kerosene, and 
possible use of biofuels or hydrogen. Based on this analysis, the report considered any 
investments in infrastructure to meet the Government’s target that emissions in 2050 will 
return to 2005 levels. The report also covers a high level assessment of a global deal on 
aviation emissions (CCC 2009b).  
     The last deliverable reports for the time period 2008-2011 are the annual reports and 
accounts known as corporate reports, which summarise key achievements against objectives 
and include audited accounts. In addition, the CCC discussed with the Scottish Government 
the advice it would provide to fulfil the advisory functions of the climate change (Scotland) 
bill. As a result of this, they published the Scottish Report (2009). Furthermore, the CCC also 
agreed with the Welsh Assembly Government that the CCC would support the climate change 
strategy for Wales; providing them with the Welsh Program Report 2011, and the report 
Appropriateness of a Northern Ireland Climate Change Act which they published in 
November 2011 (CCC 2011d). 
     The CCC works on the British framework for low-carbon research and development 
requested by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, on the appropriate level of 
the cap in the second phase of the carbon reduction commitment. Other reports that the CCC 
has published include: Carbon Reduction Commitment 2010, Review of UK Shipping 
Emissions 2011, Building a low Carbon economy 2008, and Low Carbon Innovation 2010 
and the Renewable Energy Review 2010.  
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The CCC has published reports to produce the best scientific advice to the Government. The 
CCC exists to scientifically analyse how the UK can reduce its CO2 emissions now and in the 
future. I believe that the benefits of having such a Committee lie in the interdisciplinary 
solutions they provide in their analysis.  
  
3.4.2 THE COMMITTEE AND THEIR ACTIVITIES  
According to the British Government (2010: 3), the Committee works transparently, and 
consequently they provide data about their Government structure and how they spend their 
funds available to the public. The Climate Change Act requires the CCC to provide advice, 
analysis, information or other assistance to the Government. The Committee’s statutory duties 
are to provide advice on the levels of the 2050 target, the levels of the carbon budgets 
consistent with the UK’s 2020 and 2050 targets, and its international obligations. The CCC 
also provides advice on the extent to which carbon budgets should be met by domestic 
emissions reductions versus emissions credits purchased overseas, and on the respective 
contributions towards meeting the budgets by other sectors. These include the economy 
covered by trading schemes and the sectors not covered by trading schemes, the sectors of the 
economy in which there are particular opportunities for contributions to be made towards 
meeting the budgets through reductions in emissions. The Committee also gives advice on 
each carbon budget when it comes to the consequences of including emissions from 
international aviation and shipping.  
     The CCC must also advise in the following situations: before any amendment to the 
carbon budgets; before the Government includes more greenhouse gases in those targets; 
before the Government determines the base year for those additional greenhouse gases; before 
the Government seeks to use any banking or borrowing facilities; before the Government 
includes emissions from international aviation or international shipping within those targets; 
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before introducing the first set of regulations on carbon accounting; when any substantial 
changes are made to those regulations and before establishing any trading schemes under the 
Act (HM Government 2010: 4).  
     The CCC also assesses the progress made towards implementing the Government’s 
objectives, proposals, and policies set out in the secretary of state’s adaption programme. 
Furthermore, the CCC tackles climate change through building a low-carbon economy and by 
developing framework for adapting to climate change in Britain. The CCC achieves these 
objectives by providing independent evidence-based advice to the Government on the 
appropriate level of carbon budgets, target the steps required to meet them, monitoring 
progress in meeting carbon budgets and recommending any action necessary to keep budgets 
on track.  
     According to the CCC, they conduct independent research and analysis into climate 
change, science, economics and policy as these relate to carbon budgets. They also scrutinise 
the preparation of the British climate change risk assessment and implementation of the 
Government’s adaption programme. Furthermore, the CCC engages in discussion with 
relevant parties with an interest in climate change to share evidence and analysis.  
     Investigating how the Committees ensure that their work reaches a wider audience also 
allows us to see how they facilitate and provide this information and to what degree they want 
or get any response to their work. This is also interesting because it shows how the 
Committees view themselves as a joint expert group. 
 
3.4.3 THE MODELS THAT THE COMMITTEE USES 
The CCC fulfils their duties under the Climate Change Act by reporting on progress made in 
meeting the carbon budgets. The CCC achieves this by continuing to build an evidence base 
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on realistically achievable emission reductions required to meet budgets and an action plan on 
how to deliver these reductions. The CCC framework document (2010) includes the various 
models, which the CCC will have access to or use of with varying degrees. These are: Poyry 
Energy Consulting Carbon Price Model; UK Air Passenger Demand & CO2 Forecasting 
Framework; UK Energy Model Environmental CGE Model; Global Damage cost, 
macroeconomic cost and burden sharing modelling; Non-CO2 GHG Modelling; Agriculture 
abatement, National Transport Model; Fuel Poverty Model; UK MACC Models; UK 
Macroeconomic modelling, e.g. MARKAL-Makro; Global Carbon Finance Model and the 
Energy Use in Industry model (HM Government et al 2010: 14-15). Furthermore, they have 
also developed a set of leading indicators to inform the design of a strategy for meeting 
carbon budgets and against which progress in reducing emissions can be effectively 
monitored (CCC 2009). 
     To establish credibility of the carbon budgeting framework, it is important that analysts in 
the UK Government and Devolved Administrations have a shared understanding of the 
assumptions on which the Committee will base its advice, and the Committee must maintain 
their analytical independence. A memorandum of understanding on economic modelling and 
sharing of analysis and research between relevant UK Government Departments, Devolved 
Administrations and the CCC was signed on 1
st
 May 2009 (HM Government et al 2010: 13-
14). 
     Pointing out which models and theories the Committee chooses for their analysis is 
important to further investigate on what expertise they find relevant in their work. 
 
3.4.4 THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE IN POLICY 
In this latter part of chapter three I have described the Committee on Climate Change that was 
implemented as a part of the Climate Change Act. By analysing and describing the CCC, I 
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discovered that the Committee holds annual meetings, discussion groups, and minute 
meetings. They engage with representatives interested in climate change from across the UK 
to share research and information on climate change. The CCC produces reports on the 
progress made in tackling climate change as well as other reports on a range of issues relating 
to climate change.  
     The Committee’s primary role on policy is to provide advice to the Government on the 
level of carbon budgets and report to Parliament on progress towards these goals. The 
Secretary of State of Energy and Climate Change in consultation with the Devolved 
Administrations is responsible for making decisions. It is the responsibility of the national 
authorities to ensure that arrangements are in place to inform the Committee of relevant UK 
Government and Devolved policy in a timely manner (HM Government 2010: 14). The CCC 
has been given the position, which makes them partly responsible of reaching a reduction in 
the GHG emissions. The CCC advises the Government on how best to reach the goals. This 
offers a better dialogue between policy and research and together they can achieve far more. 
The CCC works hard to be transparent and share their work through their blog, monthly 
newsletter and reports, all published through the webpage theccc.org. The Committee on 
Climate Change framed and formulated their contributions to the Act by creating their own 
profile. The CCC publishes scientific reports and ensures that their knowledge reaches the 
wider public. They do so by using their own website, communicating with different 
stakeholders, through publications and on advising the Government. 
     To further analyse, the Committee and how they as a group of experts work, I will use 
Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ (2002) article the Third Wave of Science studies and the 
responses to the report made by Jasanoff & Wynne (2003). 
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4. THE DEBATE OF CLASSIFYING EXPERTISE AND THE  
COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
4.1 THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN LIGHT OF COLLINS AND EVANS 
The words expert and expertise are mentioned several times in CCC publications and the 
Government determined the expertises within the Committee. Because “The pace of politics 
is faster than the pace of the scientific consensus formation (Collins and Evans 2007: 269)” 
political decision makers are forced to redefine what it means to be an expert. I will now 
conduct an analysis of the CCC in light of arguments put forth by Collins and Evans. 
 
4.1.1 THE CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUE AND THE CORE-SCIENTISTS 
During my analysis of the Climate Change Act and the CCC, I discovered that the UK 
Government has tried to form a Committee of experts to widen the knowledgebase on climate 
change. The Government has tried to gather a group of the best scientists so they can get the 
best scientific advice for producing policy. This effort is in line with Collins and Evans way 
of thinking on how best to make use of experts. Analysing the Climate Change Act and the 
CCC in the light of Collins and Evans has created some questions for further investigation. 
What is it that the Government is trying to do by creating this Committee of experts, how is 
the Committee formed, and what kind of results do they produce? Is it possible to use Collins 
and Evans to reflect upon how the Government tries to form a core-set? A core-set evolves 
naturally as a group of the best scientists within a field come together to share the expert 
knowledge within that specific field. The British Government performs the task as Collins 
and Evans wanted them to, because they agreed on the problem and created a group of experts 
to solve this problem. Although it is too early to know the result, we can evaluate this 
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experiment. 
     According to Collins and Evans (2002: 242), core-scientists are the most competent 
scientists in a specific field of research. Identifying these core-scientists ensures the highest 
level of expertise. According to Collins and Evans, core-scientists will be able to produce the 
best science possible, as long as the fundamental research question is agreed on. Once the 
experts are identified and the research question firmly established, then gathering this group 
of the best experts will create the best advice. When the UK established the Climate Change 
Act, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), and the Devolved Administrations together 
created the Committee on Climate Change. Now that this Committee has been formed, they 
are expected to collect and convey the best possible scientific advice so the Government can 
make the best policy possible regarding the reduction of carbon emissions.  
     However, the foundation of the knowledge is important in decision-making and the 
boundaries surrounding the classification of experts are not always being easy to establish. 
For example, as Collins and Evans (2002: 268) explain when they write about the problem of 
historical science in the Third Wave of Science Studies, there exist scientific controversies in 
which it is not to be expected that there will be any closure in the core-set debate in the 
foreseeable future. The question of global warming is a historical question. The ecological 
effects, as opposed to the effects on single organisms of GMOs, are historical problems. 
Closure on these topics should not be expected in the foreseeable future because the whole 
system in which they are embedded is too complicated to model accurately. According to 
Collins and Evans (2002: 269), in the case of historical sciences, because the role of political 
and social interests is especially prominent, there is no hope of any major increase in 
scientific input. For this reason, these historical policies rely on the participation of the lay 
public (or at least a large portion of it) for their success. 
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  In reflecting upon the subject of climate change issues and the difficulty in establishing 
an agreement between experts, Collins and Evans (2002: 243), as members of the scientific 
community, broadly maintain that scientists have special rights when it comes to decision 
making in scientific disputes. They believe that this is a reference to our culture rather than a 
reference to the way political legitimacy is granted in our society. By saying it is a reference 
to our culture Collins and Evans point out that if one takes an esoteric scientific 
controversy—such as that over the likelihood that binary neutron stars will collapse into black 
holes just before they spiral into each other members of Western society know, without 
having to worry, that anyone who is not a recognized physicist with a great deal of equipment 
or special theoretical knowledge would not and should not be counted as a member of the set 
of scientific decision-makers with regard to this issue Were members to take a different view 
of this matter they would no longer participate in Western scientific society as the term is 
used by Collins and Evans. If we have a problem that requires scientific knowledge, we 
should listen to the scientists, but there must be an agreement on the scientific problems and 
the sciences in order to grant scientists the authority to provide solutions. Thus would Collins 
and Evans be positive to the Committee since the members of CCC are experts and there is an 
agreement on the science within the Committee.    
     To further investigate this issue, I will analyse the CCC in light of Collins and Evans’ 
thoughts on the concepts of contributory expertise and public participation.   
 
4.1.2 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
By investigating the members of the board in the Committee, we can see that they come from 
different backgrounds and disciplines. Each one of these fields has their experts and some 
have their own core-scientists. Moreover, each of the members has contributory expertise in 
their own scientific field. The Government has in this case tried to form a Committee of 
44 
 
 
experts that holds the best knowledge and expertise. The Government wants to create a 
Committee where the members understand and communicate with each other fluently. In this 
way, they can collaborate to create the strongest advice that the Government can then use to 
create the best policy in a way that benefits society. This goal of communication within the 
Committee fits well with Collins and Evans’ (2007) thoughts on the concept of contributory 
expertise. Contributory expertise is what fully socialised members of a community possess. It 
refers to the ability to engage in the full range of activities associated with membership of a 
community. This encompasses tacit knowledge, practical and craft skills, and linguistic skills. 
The Committee is formed by the Government to contribute with scientific knowledge to 
making policy. 
     A good way to examine the way in which the CCC considers their own expertise is to 
show how they interact with society. According to the CCC (2011e: 9-10), during the last 
years they have continued to build their public profile. They have engaged with a large 
network of stakeholders in the climate change mitigation and adaptation field. Moreover, the 
CCC will focus on improving the way they interact with various stakeholders. They are 
achieving this by introducing innovations to the way that they communicate through the 
website, publications and social media. To highlight some of their efforts to reach out to the 
public, the national newspaper coverage about the Committee reached around 10 million 
readers each month. The CCC’s digital presence was improved through the redesign of their 
website and launch of social media. As a result of these changes, the Committee’s website 
received 100,000 visitors over the year of 2011, an improvement of 8 percent on the previous 
year’s traffic. The Committee was shortlisted as a finalist in the Climate Week Awards in 
recognition of the innovative analysis, which informed their 4
th
 carbon budget report. 
Furthermore, they introduced a more efficient process for producing reports from templates in 
order both to reduce their own carbon footprint and to reduce costs. Over the next years, the 
45 
 
 
CCC will continue to publicise their work, ensuring that the recommendations made by the 
Committee are understood and have impact on the public. The CCC goes to great lengths to 
provide the wider public with their scientific expertise but the opportunity for the public to 
respond is limited. This is much in line with Collin and Evans (2002) way of saying that 
scientist have special rights in esoteric issues.  
 
4.1.3 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION OF COLLINS AND EVANS 
The members of the Committee have been selected for the expertise they posses within the 
various scientific fields that they originally worked in. The ambitions of the Government are 
to establish a Committee that can make broader climate science than that which exists today. I 
believe Collins and Evans likely would approve of the Committee yet consider it more like an 
experiment. It is an experiment in that the Committee could establish a core-set over time, but 
that it is much too early to evaluate the long-term results of creating this Committee. There 
are, however, problems with the members of the Committee and contributory expertise. 
Having contributory expertise means that they can discuss and interact with each other 
without asking questions because they are fluent in their field and understand exactly what the 
other scientists are talking about. Yet these experts come to the Committee from various 
disciplines, thus they have to communicate on another level; they must ask questions and 
learn to understand one another. A core-set as well as having contributory expertise is 
something that is shaped and created over time. It is not possible to create an entirely new 
scientific discipline and a core-set overnight.  
     Collins and Evans’ ambition with their project is to identify the best expertise. As Collins 
and Evans (2007: 269) stated, “the pace of science is slower than the pace of politics.” The 
CCC has worked in a very short time period while at the same time trying to create a, broader 
scientific discipline in a new way also not forgetting to mention the difficulties in reaching a 
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consensus when discussing environmental issues. Furthermore, it is difficult to define the 
CCC as a core-set as of now. Over time, however, the CCC can establish or develop a group 
of experts (a core-set) that are skilled in this discipline. This will be possible if they have 
established an agreement on the scientific questions and established an idea of contributory 
expertise within their own new field.  
     According to Collins and Evans, if we want to solve the climate problem and we agree that 
this involves a question of knowledge, then we should do as they have done in the UK. We 
should establish an organisation whose purpose is to guide the Government in the right 
direction.  
     The exciting part here is that my analysis of the CCC revealed that the Committee itself 
claims to be a core-set and they believe they have the authority to give advice within the field. 
This is well in line with Collins and Evans’ idea on how to best resolve scientific disputes. 
During my study of the CCC, I did not discover any disagreements within the group. They are 
united as a Committee; they publish their reports and interact with the public in a way that 
communicates the idea that their research is highly accurate and best suited for providing the 
Government with valuable advice. There may be some difference between what goes on 
amongst the board members and what they communicate to the public.  
     The boundary between science and politics is exciting, as are the boundaries between 
giving advice and creating policy. Researchers can answer questions, which pertain to 
propositional knowledge, but most policies also shape the propositional knowledge in some 
way. However, when discussing the interaction of politics and science, Collins and Evans find 
it difficult to classify expertise. Collins and Evans (2002) claim citing the legitimacy of 
including public views in considerations related to technical decision-making does not by the 
very fact tell us how far that participation ought to extend, unless expertise is to fall down into 
politics, then one must decide where the boundaries should be drawn. The category of 
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expertise was thus expanded beyond qualifications to include interactive abilities and 
contributory experience (experience that was continuous with core-set specialists even if it 
was not accompanied by qualifications). With already settled science, experts would have 
priority to make judgments, but in cases like climate change where uncertainty and 
disagreement prevails, political decisions would need to be made so as to contextualize what 
was needed or desired from science. The guiding principle offered by Collins and Evans is 
thus to deny epistemic rights to groups simply by virtue of those groups’ claim to political 
rights and, because epistemic and political rights are conceived of as distinct, this preserves 
the convention of denying that politics is a legitimate influence in the making of technical 
decisions.  
     Collins and Evans are claiming that experts are the bearers of such rights only in their 
capacity as qualified and experienced (individual) agents, and that technical rights should 
not be extended to groups in their capacity as bearers of political/cultural positions and 
identities. Collins and Evans would likely approve of the idea of the Committee as an 
experiment in which science is produced with a higher level of speed as politics and the 
fact that experts have an important role in providing science to the Government, but they 
would remain unsure of the outcome because it is to early in the process.  
     The CCC does make efforts to be transparent and democratic; therefore I now continue to 
test my case study by using Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne’s critique of the Third Wave of 
Science Studies, which discusses the problems surrounding public participation and framing. 
 
4.2 THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN LIGHT OF JASANOFF AND WYNNE 
As a natural response to the way Collins and Evans would likely view this case, I will expand 
upon this idea by using Jasanoff and Wynne to analyse the way in which “public issues are 
framed and thus given meaning” (Wynne 2003: 402). Although I believe that Jasanoff and 
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Wynne would likely approve of a Committee such as the CCC because they think of it as only 
one frame, or just one approach to the problem among many other solutions, they would 
likely question the expertise and the knowledge that the experts choose to be the salient one. 
     Jasanoff (2003) and Wynne (2003) have responded to Collins and Evans by defending 
public participation in science policy. Hence Collins and Evans do not deny the points 
Jasanoff and Wynne offer in critique. Jasanoff and Wynne’s real challenge begins when they 
defend public participation as an aspect of good democratic decision-making: public 
participation acts as a democratic check on the scope of expert judgment (Jasanoff 2003). 
According to Wynne (2003) does functioning democracies minimize the exclusion of 
potentially affected groups and/or operate best when an audience as wide as possible sets 
agendas. The question this dispute raises is whether limiting the public enhances liberal 
democratic decision-making forums. Moreover securing the participation of experts, or by 
limiting experts and thereby securing the participation of the public.  
     To demonstrate this point, I will investigate some of the different frames of scientific 
knowledge that the CCC has produced during their time as a Committee. 
 
4.2.1 FRAMING AND THE QUESTION OF PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Wynne asks how public issues are framed and thus given meaning. He raises questions about 
how proper knowledge for relatively new domains such as environmental risk problems 
should be negotiated as matters of what Sheila Jasanoff calls civic epistemology
3
 (Wynne 
                                                          
3 Sheila Jasanoff defines civic epistemology as “the institutionalized practices by which members of a 
given society test knowledge claims used as a basis for making collective choices.” That is, civic 
epistemology encompasses facets such as styles and evidentiary standards for articulating knowledge 
claims; the empowerment of societal actors in determining who has expertise; building institutions to 
adjudicate between different knowledge claims; and developing hybrid knowledge through 
environmentalist-industry alliances (Jasanoff 2005). 
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2003: 402). Recognising these issues provokes questions of how definitions of public issues 
are established and maintained, and thus what becomes salient and what is deleted from 
collective attention. By examining relevant cases like the Climate Change Act and the CCC, 
we can investigate the knowledge and framing they have chosen as important. To show this in 
the best way, I have analysed different framings of some of the advice given to the 
Government by the CCC in their reports.  
     For example, when discussing the CCC I found that one of the sectors within the CCC 
called “Surface Transport” suggests that the UK should use bio-fuels. The analysis provided 
by the Committee supports the findings of the Gallagher review (2008) into bio-fuels, which 
stated that by 2020, 8 percent of total fuel sold on the UK’s forecourts could be made up of 
biofuels produced from sustainable sources. This could be, for example, biodiesel produced 
from rapeseed oil (CCC 2011b). However, I did a study on agro-fuels/bio-fuels in my 
bachelor thesis where I investigated different contexts within the environmental discourse 
regarding the subject of agro-fuels. The conclusion of my thesis was that one must consider a 
more examined and comprehensive way of investigating the topic to see whether agro-fuel is 
profitable both financially and environmentally (ActionAid 2008)
4
. One must consider factors 
beyond just CO2 emissions. The study shows, among other things, that agro-fuel affect food 
prices (Christian Aid 2009), food security (Bello 2010), and promotes land-grab (Third World 
Network 2010). These consequences put people into poverty, and in some cases produce more 
CO2 than oil (Friends of the Earth 2008). The study also showed that too little research has 
been done on agro-fuels and that 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 bio-fuel generation might be better alternatives 
(Biofuelwatch with more 2007). More research on developing the technology of the 
                                                          
4
 ”Life Cycle Assessment” is a key tool to evaluate impacts associated with biofules. In theory, this 
procedure considers the full impact of the entire lifecycle of a product. In practice, usually the most 
emphasis is on the prominent effects that the cycle has on land use, energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions. Several of the assessments techniques are better suited to investigate local environmental 
issues as air pollution and changes in the biodiversity (ActionAid 2008). 
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consumption of gas in car engines would give better results than producing agro-fuels 
(Christian Aid 2009). I realise that my bachelor assignment does not have any direct links to 
the reports published by the CCC, but the big picture of different contexts remains relevant 
here. The Committee suggests that 8 percent of the total fuel sold in the UK should be 
replaced by Bio-fuels to cut down carbon emissions. By investigating other framings of the 
same solution, provides more knowledge that should be included in the process of producing 
the solution.  
     Carbon budgets are another controversial subject as part of the recommendations made by 
the CCC. Within the CCC reports, the first three budgets have been proposed for 2008 until 
2022 along with the recommendation that they apply to all Kyoto
5
 GHGs, not just CO2. In 
line with the EU climate and Energy package agreed upon in December 2008—to which the 
UK is legally committed—the CCC recommends that the UK Government set two target 
budgets. The initial interim budget would apply immediately. The second intended budget, 
entailing more demanding cuts in emission, would apply if and when a global agreement is 
reached (CCC 2008: 159).  
     However, according to a report entitled Making a Climate Commitment: Analysis of the 
first Report (2008) of the UK Committee on Climate Change, the pathways and budgets 
within the report allow for varying amounts of reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide or 
greenhouse gasses made in order to compensate for or offset an emission made elsewhere 
                                                          
5 The Protocol defines several mechanisms ("flexible mechanisms") that are designed to allow 
countries to meet their emission reduction commitments (caps) with reduced economic impact. Under 
Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol, Parties may use GHG removals, from afforestation and reforestation 
(forest sinks) and deforestation (sources) since 1990, to meet their emission reduction commitments. 
Parties may also use International Emissions Trading (IET). Under the treaty, for the 5-year 
compliance period from 2008 until 2012, nations that emit less than their quota will be able to sell 
Assigned amount units to nations that exceed their quota. It is also possible for countries to sponsor 
carbon projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other countries. These projects generate 
tradable carbon credits that can be used by countries in meeting their caps. The project-based Kyoto 
Mechanisms are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) (UN 2011). 
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(offsetting). Such offsetting may be done through the EU Emission Trading Systems (ETS), 
or the conventional instruments provided within the Kyoto Protocol. The extent to which 
offsetting can occur, and the quality of the offsetting in relation to equivalent emission, is a 
way to measure and describe how much global warming a given type of greenhouse gas may 
cause. Using the functionally equivalent amount or concentration of CO2 as the reference 
credits to achieve the total amount of the emission reduction required, has significant 
implications for the UK’s climate commitment. Since the CCC published its Report, the EU 
has revised the EU ETS Directive as part of their new climate and energy package (Bows et al. 
2009: 12-17). This means that the UK’s combined traded and non-traded sectors could buy 
out approximately 17 percent and 27 percent of the reductions necessary under the interim 
and intended pathways respectively. In other words, the UK could reduce the effort necessary 
to meet the interim pathway by 17 percent and the intended pathway by 27 percent, with the 
effort essentially transferred to less industrialized nations outside of the EU. Taken to its limit, 
the UK could purchase all the traded sector emission reductions from within the EU and 23 
percent of the non-traded sector reductions from outside the EU. In theory, at least three 
quarters of all the UK’s emission-reduction effort to meet the CCC’s intended pathway could 
be undertaken outside of the UK. The figure is 65 percent for the interim pathway. This will 
prevent the reduction of CO2 emissions now and in the future (Bows et al. 2009: 21-23, 31-
32). Furthermore, the CCC does not discuss the issues regarding lock-in
6
. According to a 
                                                          
6 Lock-in describes the circumstances whereby society becomes committed to a particular future 
emissions pathway through the investment choices made by governments and industry. Developed 
from evolutionary economics, lock-in takes account of how technologies become intertwined with 
institutional and social processes, making it difficult to shift to alternative ways of doing things. In 
relation to climate change, lock-in is often used in conjunction with terms like energy intensive or high 
carbon to indicate present day investments in capitally expensive high-emitting infrastructure and 
processes. In the case of major public infrastructure such as power plants, transport networks, and the 
energy distribution grid, the lock-in effect is likely to endure for several decades, thus frustrating 
subsequent efforts to mitigate emissions (Bows et al 2009: 27). 
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report by the Tyndall Centre, a significant weakness of the CCC’s progress reports arises 
from a combination of its support for relatively high levels of buy-out and trading. The 
implications of this are difficult to exaggerate and have the potential to inadvertently lend 
credibility to Governmental decisions that cannot be reconciled with the CCC’s own carbon 
pathways. The findings of the Committee’s reports could be used to justify a program of new 
coal-fired power stations, provided they were constructed as capture ready. Nevertheless, this 
would lock the UK into high levels of cumulative emissions, regardless of whether capture 
technologies were retrofitted or not. However, whilst the electricity from coal-fired stations 
does not necessarily lock-in end-user practices alternative low-carbon electricity is available, 
this is not the case for some other lock-in policies. 
     Announcing the go-ahead for the third flight runway, the Government claimed that UK 
aviation emissions in 2050 would be no higher than they were in 2005. This in stark contrast 
to the Department for Transport’s report published on the same day, and in which aviation 
emissions are predicted to increase by 60 percent by 2050. This “apparent” contradiction, 
however, was plausible as the Government were relying on purchasing the necessary 
emissions from outside of the UK. This is an approach broadly supported by the CCC’s report, 
both explicitly in terms of buy-out and trading and implicitly through its neglect of social 
practice lock-in. Once the new runway is constructed, there will be increased pressure for 
additional terminals. The provision of new capacity will lead to additional demand, new 
routes, increased frequency, and new aircraft all contributing to new and reinforced practices 
for which few alternatives exist. Businesses develop overseas markets and international 
conferences become the norm. In contrast to the electricity generation, there is little 
opportunity for alternative low carbon solutions to replace them (Bows 2009: 32-33). 
     In the article: From long-term targets to cumulative emissions pathways: Reframing UK  
Climate Policy by Anderson and Bows (2008: 3714-3722), the authors of this article question 
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the problem of using the 2°C as a base for whose reports. Since the publication of the IPCC 
last report, there is evidence both from within the scientific and to a lesser extent, the policy 
community, of an escalating uneasiness with the rhetoric of 2°C and its subsequent 
implications for effective policy. Increasingly, it is becoming evident that even if all orthodox 
mitigation measures were implemented as a matter of urgency, it would be difficult to avoid 
temperatures rising by less than 4°C. However, even this would require rapid curtailment of 
deforestation, a radical reversal in emission trends from food production, and urgent 
decarbonisation of the global energy system.  
     According to Bows et al. (2009: 29), the rhetoric of the 2°C threshold continues to subvert 
meaningful scientific and policy dialogue on mitigation and as a consequence, adaptation. 
Whilst the CCC Report demonstrates significant independence from the political process, it is 
nevertheless constrained by the analytical limitations imposed by the Government’s repeated 
commitment to 2°C. The report certainly makes challenging demands of policy makers. The 
CCC’s reports are therefore inevitably and significantly compromised by its implicit need to 
deliver demanding but nonetheless politically acceptable conclusions in line with the 2°C 
threshold.  
     In this part of my analysis I have put forth different interpretations of the proposals that the 
CCC has created as a contribution to the Government. These different framings include 
mainly that replacing the total fuel sold in the UK with bio-fuels is problematic according to 
research provided by different organizations. Furthermore, I showed the different contexts 
regarding the concept of lock-in. I also showed that sometimes politics establish science such 
as the question of the 2°C versus the scientific 4°C. Whereas the 2°C is the goal of almost all 
climate strategies but the consensus within the scientific field of climate change is that we 
most likely have to look at the possibilities of an increase in temperature with 4°C.  
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     Jasanoff explains the framing of scientific issues well when she describes it as the problem 
of different “life worlds” entailing altogether different perceptions of uncertainty, 
predictability, and control. The knowledge stemming from these divergent experimental 
contexts was more than a simple addition; it represented radically “other” ways of 
understanding the world. This is why it is always important to test and question expertise 
(Jasanoff 2003). By analysing different contexts done on the Committee’s own advice to the 
Government can we further investigate what knowledge and expertise was chosen over other 
knowledge and expertises. 
 
4.2.2 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ABOUT FRAMING AND PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
It is the classification of experts that concerns both Jasanoff and Wynne. The categories of 
expertise, expert faculties, and sciences are intended to help the public and decision-makers to 
draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate inclusiveness in technical debates 
conducted in the public domain. This is a complex architecture for an issue that is far older 
than the concern of contemporary science studies; the field of law, for instance, has been 
grappling with institutional problems of expertise since the late 18
th
 century (Jasanoff 2003: 
391). There is much controversy surrounding the classification of expert groups like the CCC 
and the scientific knowledge these experts decide to produce. It raises a problem such as 
which propositional question and knowledge proves salient (Wynne 2003: 402). To reinforce 
her point, Jasanoff (2003: 392) refers to literature from the field of STS such as the works of 
Shapin and Schaffer, Ezrahi and Latour, noting that none of these authors essentialise the 
nature of expertise, showing it instead to be always historically situated and grounded in 
practice. The Government provided a framework, which the CCC works within. Thus creating 
a co-production of science and policy, where the policy, shapes the science of a Committee, 
which is supposed to provide independent research. To ensure that science remains reflexive, 
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it is important to open up to different frames and public participation. The framing of the 
problem or issue therefore deserves far more attention in Collins and Evans’ normative theory 
of expertise, for as Wynne (2003: 410) points out, context may become content. Yet Collins 
and Evans (2007: 125) pay little attention to this in their book Rethinking Expertise, apart 
from a little note towards the end addressing the issue of framing where they state that if, in 
our society, we want to retain the idea of Western science, we must want our scientists to be 
right. Collins and Evans ask if science should be a democratic process or be based on the best 
expert advice. Jasanoff (2003) explains that we need both strong democracy and good 
expertise. According to Wynne (2003: 410), Collins and Evans would reduce public policy 
and the larger public arena in which negotiations of meaning, authority, and legitimacy take 
place to what Habermas (1975) long ago critically dismissed as decisionism. This is a model 
in which policy and political processes are conceptualised exclusively as a series of 
completely unrelated specific decisions, without the interaction between process and policy. 
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5. FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
During the analysis of the Climate Change Act and the CCC, I discovered that the 
Government has tried to form a Committee of experts to widen the knowledgebase on climate 
change. In order for the Government to produce the best policy to improve the climate in the 
UK, they must be able to rely on the best scientific advice possible. The Climate Change Act 
can also possibly set a good example for the rest of the global community. These attempts are 
very much in the line with scholars Collins and Evans in their effort to promote the 
classification of expertise. Collins and Evans would like us to listen to and not interfere with 
the experts if the problem needs an expert-based answer. 
      However, the risk associated with this is the empowerment of the technocratic society. 
According to Jasanoff and Wynne, science must always be tested because it is a problem for 
propositional knowledge to decide what constitutes as the truth. The concept of co-production, 
as discussed by Jasanoff (2004) and Miller (2004), can provide better insight into the efforts 
of Collins and Evans to create a normative classification of expertise. Involving the public 
would as I see it force the Committee to investigate and discover different contexts in 
scientific disputes. By emphasizing the difficulty of separating facts from values, the STS 
literature has been highly effective by giving a new understanding of how the authority is 
established. The problem of knowledge is not so much between different knowledge claims as 
it is between the different sets of values and commitments they embody (Evans and Plows 
2011). In this thesis, my findings illustrate the way in which the Climate Change Act and the 
CCC have framed and formulated expertise and contributed to producing scientific advice, 
thus contributing to make the best climate policy. This is an exciting experiment and time will 
tell whether it succeeds. Although the CCC makes an effort to promote their advice and 
knowledge, I believe they must be more open to public participation, thus to the different 
framings of propositional knowledge. The policy shapes the science by providing the 
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framework that maps out the role of the independent body the CCC this does create a conflict 
of interest, a co-production of as Jasanoff (2003) called it “different life worlds.” Because of 
this the Committee would benefit from including as many different contexts and framings as 
possible in order to produce the best science. Because the different frames provide knowledge 
and expertise that can prove valuable in developing a broader climate science than exists 
today.  
     During my research I established three research questions; I will now go through them to 
explain my findings. Research question number one: How does the Climate Change Act frame 
and define the expertise within the Committee on Climate Change? My analysis shows the 
process of carefully defining expertise by creating a framework that explains how the CCC 
should work and choosing the different expertise that the Government wanted the members of 
the Committee to have. The Government chose eight members from different disciplines; they 
are the foundation for creating an expert group on a broader climate science then we have 
today. The framework is designed in a way that gives the Committee specific work tasks. 
Analysing these tasks gave me the opportunity to find out how the Climate Change Act 
frames expertise within the CCC. Investigating the criteria on which the members were 
chosen allowed me to examine how expertise was defined within the Committee. The Climate 
Change Act created a framework document. The document carefully defined the different 
types of expertise and qualifications that the different members had to possess. The document 
also mapped out the different models and established climate science, which the Committee 
were to use in their work.  
     My second research question was as follows: How does the Committee on Climate Change 
frame and formulate their contributions to the Climate Change Act? By analysing the 
products made by the Committee, I was able to look at the way in which they worked and the 
scientific knowledge they choose to include in their reports and advice. The CCC has been 
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given a position of power in relation to reducing carbon emissions by advising the 
Government on how best to reach their goals. The Committee presents themselves as a group 
with a common goal: they publish reports, hold meetings, and aim to get their message out to 
the public. However, there is not much evidence that the public has any channel to respond to 
the work of the Committee. 
     My third and last research question was: How will analysing and evaluating the CCC 
contribute to STS scholars Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ efforts to create a normative 
theory of classification of expertise? This research question was important to shed light on the 
ongoing debate on defining and classifying expertise. My analysis contributes to this debate 
by analysing the CCC and the Climate Change Act using theory and concepts from the field 
of STS. By analysing the CCC, I discovered how the Government created a group of experts 
to solve political problems, which the Government could then use to make policy. This is 
much in line with Collins and Evans’ way of thinking. There were some similarities between 
Collins and Evans and Jasanoff and Wynne regarding the issues surrounding climate change 
policy, science, and public participation. According to Collins and Evans, reaching an 
agreement on controversial historical sciences like climate change is difficult and therefore 
requires public participation. Wynne and Jasanoff argue that the different contexts provide 
different solutions, and these different contexts can be provided by public participation. 
According to Jasanoff, expertise needs to be tested; for this reason, it is necessary to 
investigate different solutions. 
     Although it might look like Collins and Evans fully agrees with Jasanoff and Wynne. 
However, this is not the case. If there were a scientific dispute that experts agree upon and the 
scientists found a scientific solution to this dispute, then this would be the framing that 
Collins and Evans would rely on. Collins and Evans would no longer be interested in any 
other way of solving the problem. Jasanoff and Wynne however, would see this frame 
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provided by the experts as just part of the solution and would look for more framings rather 
than choosing just one. They believe that it is a democratic check on the experts to provide as 
many frames as possible. Analysing the CCC I believe that there is a need to classify experts 
in our society because the Committee has been able to produce scientific advice in the pace of 
politics and thereby contributing to a more science based policy. Although I agree with 
Collins and Evans I also believe that the Committee as an independent group of experts would 
benefit from public participation to provide as many frames as possible to ensure the best 
scientific results. Also to avoid that science is separated from society and remains reflexive, 
makes it important to use public participation and frames as way to make sure that science is 
always challenged and tested.  
     Furthermore, I presented some of the different framings of the published advice made by 
the Committee. In spite of the attempts of the Committee to be open and transparent, room for 
public participation remains limited. The Committee would benefit from organising an open 
forum where they can interact with the public so that the interplay between the public and 
Committee can grow stronger. By doing so, the CCC will have the benefit of yet another 
analytical tool in their efforts to provide the best climate science for advising the Government 
on carbon reduction in the UK.  
     My research is inspired by the work of Harry Collins, Robert Evans, Sheila Jasanoff, and 
Brian Wynne. The findings in this thesis are also inspired by the work done on framing and 
expertise. My case provides insight to the interplay between science, policy, and expertise by 
taking as its case study a group of experts producing scientific advice on how to make the best 
climate policy possible. Thus contributing to Collins and Evans’ development of the 
classification of expertise, my thesis is however not written to prove who qualifies as an 
expert or which framings are the right ones; rather, it aims to discover the processes around 
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the classification of expertise in order to get a better understanding of this part of the STS 
field. 
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